BAEC Bulletin | March/April 2022 | 33
and determining that the debtor’s debt was not dischargeable because it was incurred with intentionally false and fraudulent representations. The debtor appealed to the District Court and the creditor moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Bankruptcy Court’s Order was not an appealable final order because the amount of the debt had not been determined by the Bankruptcy Court and a judgment had not yet been entered against the debtor. Noting that “there is a strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals,” and that “a dispute is not completely resolved until the bankruptcy court determines the amount of damages to be awarded,” the Court found that the Order was not appealable because it did not resolve all of the issues in the adversary proceeding, including the amount of damages to be awarded. As a result, the Court lacked jurisdiction to address the appeal and granted the creditor’s motion to dismiss. Motion to Seal In Spring, et al. v. Allegany-Limestone Central School District , et al., 14-cv-476-WMS (Sept. 14, 2021)—an action for damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)—defendants moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that decedent did not have a qualifying disability as defined under the ADA and the RA. After submitting an affirmation attesting to decedent’s medical and psychological problems, plaintiff then moved to seal decedent’s medical records, individual education plans, and psychosocial assessments that had been attached as exhibits to the opposing affirmation. After noting strong competing interests that supported the compelling arguments advanced by both parties, the Court ruled that all of the subject records would be sealed. The Court acknowledged that there were strong First Amendment and common law presumptions -- of public access to judicial documents and proceedings -- that weighed against the seal request. Yet the Court also noted that, in this circuit, courts regularly allow medical records to be filed under seal when the parties have a strong privacy interest in that medical information. Here, notwithstanding that the decedent’s privacy interest in his medical records was diminished because he was deceased, the Court nevertheless found that the public interest to access was outweighed by the still significant privacy interest held by decedent. The Court also found that the public’s interest in access could be protected by the Court’s decisions not being filed under seal and by any references to the relevant records being unredacted. Rule 60-b Motion to Vacate In Mandala, et al. v. NTT Data, Inc. , 18-cv-6591- CJS (Dec. 6, 2021)—a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related state laws alleging disparate impact claims against defendant for its alleged policy not to hire individuals with criminal convictions—plaintiffs moved pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the Court’s judgment and permit plaintiffs to file a first amended complaint. The Rule 60(b) motion was filed after the Court had granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and plaintiffs’ petition for re-hearing en banc was denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the judgment relied heavily on a reference, made by the majority in its decision denying the en banc hearing, to statistics introduced in an amicus brief, and encouragement by the dissent that plaintiffs should move under Rule 60 for leave to file an amended complaint that included those statistics. The Court denied the motion, and first clarified that the liberal standard favoring leave to amend under Rule 15 applied to pretrial applications, and not to post-judgment applications under Rules 59 and 60. In the post-judgment context, plaintiffs must present adequate grounds
for relief under Rule 60, and the Court must give “due regard,” but not “sole regard,” to Rule 15, “lest the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) ‘swallow the philosophy favoring finality of judgments whole.’” Turning to the specifics of the application before it, the Court disagreed that plaintiffs were unwitting victims of an ambiguous standard that was unpredictably applied to their detriment and then clarified by the appellate court. The Court instead found that the appellate court merely summarized existing law, and therefore plaintiffs’ motion to vacate was untimely because such an application under Rule 60(b)(1) was required to be made no more than one year after entry of judgment. The Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to establish the “extraordinary circumstances” required for such relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because that provision was not intended to relieve plaintiffs from the consequences of their conscious and informed litigation strategy and their “free, calculated, and deliberate choices,” especially when plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to add the decade-old statistics to their complaint, including after the motion to dismiss was briefed, oral argument occurred, and the Court’s initial decision was issued. Judicial Immunity In Arce v. Vilardo , 21-cv-00588-EAW (Nov. 28, 2021), a pro se plaintiff filed suit against the District Judge who presided over plaintiff’s prior lawsuit against several New York State court judges. The prior lawsuit was dismissed on grounds of judicial immunity and plaintiff claimed that the District Judge abused his position as a judicial officer by protecting other judicial officers from wrongdoing, while denying him the appointment of counsel in order to hide judicial abuses. Because plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court found that it was statutorily required to screen plaintiff’s complaint, and would be obligated by statute to dismiss it if it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such an award. Then, noting that judges are absolutely immune from suit for action taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities, and that even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity, the Court found that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint concerned actions performed by the District Judge in his judicial capacity. Finally, because the defects in plaintiff’s complaint were substantive and could not be cured by “better pleading,” the complaint was dismissed, with prejudice, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person was denied. • “even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity”
Powered by FlippingBook