BAEC Bulletin | March/April 2023 | 33
BY KEVIN M. HOGAN AND SEAN C. MCPHEE Western District Case Notes
Recusal and Rule 11 Sanctions In Adams III v. Taylor, 21-cv-6056-EAW (Nov. 29, 2022), an action brought pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff moved to disqualify the Judge and for sanctions under Rule 11 after multiple attempts to serve defendant did not succeed. The Court denied the recusal motion after finding that plaintiff failed to present any, let along sufficient, grounds upon which the Judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Court had both issued a Valentin Order directing the Attorney General to identify the correct name and address of defendant and extended the deadline within which to complete service, and plaintiff’s frustration in accomplishing the task of service did not justify the requested recusal. The Court then denied the Rule 11 sanctions motion for two separate reasons. First, a Rule 11 sanctions motion was not the proper vehicle for seeking the relief sought by plaintiff where, as here, the motion was not based on any alleged misrepresentation in a pleading, frivolous defense, or unsupported factual contention, as required by Rule 11. In addition, the motion did not comply with the safe harbor provision under Rule 11 that requires the moving party to serve the motion 21 days before filing it with the Court. Standing In Animal Welfare Institute et. al. v. Vilsack et. al., 20-cv- 6595-CJS (Oct. 31, 2022), plaintiffs, two private organizations dedicated to seeking better treatment for animals and promote vegan living, filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act contending that two rule-making petitions they filed were unlawfully denied by Defendants. The Court previously had ruled, before denying a motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts with respect to standing to survive the motion to dismiss on that ground. Turning now to motions for summary judgment, however, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to set forth by affidavit or other proof specific facts sufficient to establish standing as required by Article III. The actions by defendants about which plaintiffs complained did not impose an involuntary burden on plaintiffs’ core activities, but rather perpetuated the status quo, thus falling short of what is required to establish organizational standing. Plaintiffs also failed to establish an injury sufficiently particularized, actual, and imminent to establish associational standing on behalf of any of their members. The Court also held that, even if plaintiffs had standing to bring their lawsuit, defendants had not acted inconsistent with law or abused their discretion when they denied the two rule-making petitions, because the conduct that plaintiffs’ sought to regulate falls outside the scope of what defendants are charged with regulating under the implicated
KEVIN M. HOGAN Managing Partner Phillips Lytle LLP
SEAN C. MCPHEE Partner Phillips Lytle LLP
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