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| November/December 2024 | BAEC Bulletin
BAEC Bulletin | November/December 2024 |
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COURT OF APPEALS EXPOUNDS ON THE “COMMUNITY CARETAKING” DOCTRINE IN “OPEN-AND-SHUT” AUTOMOBILE STOP CASE BY HON. THOMAS P. FRANCZYK, MENTOR-AT-LARGE TO THE ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAM I NTRODUCTION
absence of any observed Vehicle and Traffic violations (citing, inter alia, People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]). COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES The Court found that the mere act of opening and shutting the passenger door was too innocuous to justify pulling the vehicle over to inquire about passenger safety (which wasn’t done in any event). In the court’s view, a door can be opened and closed, for example, to fasten it more securely or to release a seatbelt or item of clothing caught up therein. The Court ruled that the police may stop a vehicle in an exercise of their community-caretaking function (CCF) if 1. they can point to SPECIFIC, OBJECTIVE and ARTICU- LABLE FACTS that would lead a reasonable person(?) to conclude that an occupant needs assistance, and 2. the intrusion is REASONABLY TAILORED (i.e., limited in scope) to the perceived need for assistance. An officer’s conclu- sory statements, therefore, regarding safety concerns (as occurred here) will not suffice (citing Livingstone, supra at 173). The Court noted however, contrary to the defendant’s arguments, that an officer’s concurrent concerns about possible criminality should not necessarily preclude a valid stop under the CCD because it is not uncommon for citizens’ distress and need for police intervention to arise in the context of criminal conduct (e.g., kidnapping in a vehicle or passengers at the mercy of a drunk driver). Mindful of the possibility that police officers might try to use the CCD as an excuse to attempt an end-run around the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of PROBABLE CAUSE (for a V&T violation) or REASONABLE SUSPICION (of criminality) (People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427 [2020]), the Court cautioned that suppression courts must close- ly scrutinize cases where this free-standing exception is advanced. As a further precaution, the Court observed that once the police are satisfied that the danger has been dispelled (or turned out to be a false alarm), any further intrusion MUST meet traditional Fourth Amendment standards (citing Livingston, supra at 74-75, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 191 [1992], People v Banks, 85 NY2d 558 [1995]). Therefore, since the police failed to articulate specific, ob- jective facts that would reasonably suggest that an occu- pant in the defendant’s vehicle needed assistance, the first prong of the CCD was not met, thus warranting reversal and dismissal of the information. CRITICAL CONCURRENCE The concurring judge (Rivera, J.), agreed with the majori-
ty’s decision to strike down this stop but faulted them for inventing and relying unnecessarily on a new rule (CCD based on specific, objective facts and limited in its scope) when the police conduct in this case clearly fell far short of basic Fourth Amendment requirements (People v Hin- shaw, supra). In this judge’s estimation, there was no need to look any further (despite the parties’ request for high-court guid- ance on the parameters of the community caretaking rule), and instead of providing clarity (when none was needed), the majority not only violated principles of judi- cial restraint but also created confusion (citing People v Carvajal, 6 NY3d 305 [2005]). The majority’s approach, according to the concurrence, invites police to stretch the CCD’s amorphous limits and encourages unconstitutional stops based on nothing more than hunches. In sum, whether the police have violated the Fourth Amendment boils down to whether their actions were OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE, even when responding to potential, non-criminal, public safety concerns. FINAL THOUGHT Considering Brown, defense counsel can reasonably expect “community caretaking” to be advanced more fre- quently as a basis for stopping vehicles in the absence of probable cause (of traffic violations) or reasonable sus- picion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur. In such cases, counsel should heed the Court’s admonition to carefully examine such claims (not unlike other time-worn chestnuts including “smell of marijuana, “turning without signaling” and “tinted windows”) to en- sure that unconstitutional police interference with motor vehicles are stopped in their tracks.
ahead travelling at about 25 miles-per-hour (below the speed limit). They observed no vehicle and traffic viola- tions but noticed the passenger side door quickly open and close as the vehicle approached an intersection. They decided to pull the vehicle over because one of the officers thought that “maybe someone needed some sort of aid, or something was going on inside.” He also acknowledged that considerations of potential criminality played a part in his decision to pull the vehicle over. As they approached, they saw no furtive movements inside, heard no cries for help, but they did smell marijua- na as they got closer on either side of the vehicle. One officer asked the defendant for his license and registra- tion and to state where he was going, but no inquiry was made whether any of the three occupants (two in front and one in back) were in distress or in need of assis- tance. The officer directed the defendant to get out of the vehi- cle and asked him if he had anything on him. He replied “Ecstasy” (his preferred “party drug”) which the officer retrieved from his pants pocket. He then searched inside the vehicle and found more Ecstasy and marijuana. The defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of Controlled Substance (CPCS) 7th degree and later plead- ed guilty to Disorderly Conduct after his motion to sup- press was denied. LOWER COURTS SAY The suppression court found that it was reasonable on these facts for the officers to be concerned for the safety of the occupants which outweighed considerations of the defendant’s freedom to travel unencumbered by police interruption. The court was also satisfied that these safety concerns were not influenced by a recent radio call of a fleeing assault suspect in the vicinity (of which he claimed to be unaware). The Appellate Term similarly held that the stop was justified upon public safety considerations even in the
In the recent case of People v Brown (_NY3d_ , 2024 NY Slip Op 02765 [2024]), the Court of Appeals reversed lower-court decisions that upheld on “public safety” grounds the stop of a motor vehicle based only on an officer’s observation of the front passenger door open-
ing and closing while the vehicle was in motion. While acknowledging the long-recognized right (in- deed, the duty) of police to respond to and render assistance to people in distress, (People v Gallmon, 19 NY2d 389 [1967], People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 328 [1976], People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328 [2002]), the Court found that the stop in this case failed to satisfy the requirements of the community caretaking doctrine (CCD). Though the suppression court upheld the stop (and subsequent seizure of Ecstasy from the defendant/driv- er and his vehicle) based on what it perceived as a rea- sonable concern for the safety of the occupants (and affirmed by the Appellate Term of the 1st Department at 19 Misc 3d 127(A) [2023]), the Court of Appeals chose to analyze this encounter under the CCD. In so doing, the Court held that the People must put forth specific and articulable facts objectively indicat- ing a need for police intervention and a response that is proportionate to circumstances at hand (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v Livingstone, 174 A 3d 327 [2017], Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433 [1973], Caniglia v Strom, 593 US 194 [2021]).
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FACTS: Two officers travelling in an unmarked patrol car ob- served the defendant’s vehicle about a car-length
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